tions, which are much more subject to direct state authority. The notion of global cities captures this particular embeddedness of global finance in actual financial centers.[36] In the case of private digital spaces such as those described here for global finance, this embeddedness carries significant implications for theory and politics, specifically, for the conditions through which governments and citizens can act on this new electronic world.

In brief, the private digital space of global finance intersects in at least two specific ways with the world of state authority and law. One is through the introduction of new types of norms, those reflective of the operational logic of the global capital market, into national state policy. The other is through the partial embeddedness of even the most digitized financial markets in actual financial centers, an intersection that in part returns global finance to the world of national governments. Global digitized finance makes legible some of the complex and novel imbrications of law and place and the fact that it is not simply an overriding of national state authority. It consists, rather, of both the use of that authority for the implementation of regulations and laws that respond to the interests of global finance *and* the renewed weight of that authority in the case of financial centers.

Chapter Four
The Global City: Recovering Place and Social Practices

The master images in the currently dominant account of economic globalization emphasize hypermobility, global communications, and the neutralization of place and distance. There is a tendency to take the existence of a global economic system as a given, a function of the power of transnational corporations and global communications. This emphasis brings to the fore both the power and the technical attributes of the global corporate economy. A sociological inquiry needs to go beyond givens and attributes. It needs to examine the making of these conditions and the consequences of this making.

The capabilities for global operation, coordination, and control contained in the new information technologies and in the power of transnational corporations need to be produced. By focusing on the production of these capabilities, we add a neglected dimension to the familiar issue of the power of large corporations and the new technologies. The emphasis shifts to the practices that constitute what we call economic globalization and global control: the work of producing and reproducing the organization and management of both a global production system and a global marketplace for finance under conditions of economic concentration. A focus on practices draws the categories of place and production process into the analysis of economic globalization. These are two categories easily overlooked

in accounts centered on the hypermobility of capital and the power of transnationals. Developing categories such as place and production process (even in finance) does not negate the centrality of hypermobility and power. Rather, these categories bring to the fore the fact that many of the resources necessary for global economic activities are not hypermobile and are indeed deeply embedded in places such as global cities and export-processing zones, and so are many global work-processes.

Why is it important to recover place and production in analyses of the global economy, particularly as they are constituted in major cities? It is because they allow us to see the multiplicity of economies and work cultures in which the global information economy is embedded. They also allow us to recover the concrete, localized processes through which globalization takes shape and to argue that much of the multiculturalism in large cities is as much a part of globalization as is international finance. Finally, focusing on cities allows us to specify a geography of strategic places at the global scale, places bound to one another by the dynamics of economic globalization. I refer to this as a new geography of centrality, and one of the questions it engenders is whether this new transnational geography is also the space for new transnational politics. Insofar as an economic analysis of the global city recovers the broad array of jobs and work cultures that are part of the global economy, though typically not marked as such, it allows us to examine the possibility of new forms of inequality arising from economic globalization. And it allows us to detect new types of politics among traditionally disadvantaged workers; that is, it allows us to understand in its empirical detail whether operating in this transnational economic geography as

it materializes in global cities makes a difference to the disadvantaged. This politics of the disadvantaged would be a politics arising from economic participation in the global economy by those who hold the "other" jobs in that economy, whether factory workers in export-processing zones in Asia, workers in garment sweatshops in Los Angeles, or janitors on Wall Street.

The specific sociological question organizing the examination of these kinds of issues is whether we are actually seeing new social forms among old social conditions. Thus power, capital mobility, economic and political disadvantage, homelessness, gangs—all existed long before the current phase of globalization. But are the types of power, mobility, inequality, homelessness, professional classes and households, gangs, and politics that we saw emerge in the 1980s sufficiently distinct from those of the past that they are actually novel social forms even though in a general sense they look the same as they always have? My argument is that many are indeed new social forms because they arise out of the specificity of the current phase. Thus the empirical details of these social forms are also a window into the features of the current globalization phase.

These are the subjects addressed in this chapter. The first section examines the possibility that the city, a complex type of place, has once again become a lens through which to examine major processes that unsettle existing arrangements. The second section examines the role of place and production in analyses of the global economy. Based on this recovery of place-based activities in a global economy, the third section posits the formation of new cross-border geographies of centrality and marginality constituted by these processes of globalization. Returning to the consequences of these processes for the spe-

cific types of places involved in these geographies, the fourth section discusses some of the elements that suggest the formation of a new sociospatial order in global cities. The fifth section examines particular localizations of the global by focusing on immigrant women in global cities. The final section considers the global city as a nexus where these various trends come together and produce new political alignments.

The City: Its Return as a Lens for Social Theory

The city has long been a strategic site for the exploration of many major subjects confronting society and sociology. But it has not always been a heuristic space—a space capable of producing knowledge about some of the major transformations of an epoch. In the first half of the twentieth century the study of cities was at the heart of sociology. This is evident in the work of Georg Simmel, Max Weber, Walter Benjamin, and most prominently, the Chicago school, especially Robert Park and Louis Wirth, both deeply influenced by German sociology; and, though writing later, Henri Lefebvre. These sociologists confronted massive processes—industrialization, urbanization, alienation—in a new cultural formation they called urbanity. For them studying the city was not simply about studying the urban. It was about studying the major social processes of an era. Since then the study of the city, and with it urban sociology, have gradually lost their privileged roles as lenses through which to view the discipline and as producers of key analytic categories. There are many reasons for this change, most important among which are the particular developments of method and data in sociology in general. Critical is the fact that the city ceased serving as the fulcrum for epochal transformations and hence as a strategic site for research on nonurban processes. Urban sociology became increasingly concerned with what came to be called social problems.

Today, as we begin a new century, the city is once again emerging as a strategic site for understanding some of the major new trends reconfiguring the social order. The city, together with the metropolitan region, is one of the spaces where major macrosocial trends materialize and hence can be constituted as an object of study. Among these trends are globalization, the rise of the new information technologies, the intensification of transnational and translocal dynamics, and the strengthened presence and voice of specific types of sociocultural diversity. Each of these trends has its specific conditionalities, content, and consequences. The urban moment is but one moment in a number of often complex multisited trajectories, and this raises an important question: can the sociological study of cities produce scholarship and analytic tools that help us understand the broader social transformations under way today, as it did early in the preceding century? One critical issue here is whether these larger transformations evince sufficiently complex and multivalent urban instantiations to allow us to construct such instantiations as objects of study. The urban moment of a major process is susceptible to empirical study in ways that other phases of such a process might not: The financial center is more concrete than electronic capital flows.

At the same time this partial urbanization of major dynamics repositions the city itself as an object of study: what is it we are naming today when we use the construct of the city? The city has long been a debatable construct, whether in early writings (Castells 1977; Harvey 1982) or in very recent work

(Brenner 1998; Lloyd 2005; Paddison 2001; Drainville 2004; Satler 2006). Today we are seeing a partial unbundling of national space and the traditional hierarchies of scale centered on the national, with the city nested somewhere between the local and the region. This unbundling, even if partial, makes conceptualizing the city as nested in such hierarchies problematic. Major cities have historically been nodes where a variety of processes intersect in particularly pronounced concentrations. In the context of globalization many of these processes are operating at a global scale that cuts across historical borders, with the added complexities that brings with it.

Cities emerge as one territorial or scalar moment in a transurban dynamic.[1] The city here is not a bounded unit but a complex structure that can articulate a variety of cross-boundary processes and reconstitute them as a partly urban condition (Sassen 2001). Furthermore, this type of city cannot be located simply in a scalar hierarchy that puts it below the national, regional, and global. It is one of the spaces *of* the global, and it engages the global directly, often bypassing the national. Some cities may have had this capacity long before the current era, but today these conditions have been multiplied and amplified to the point where they can be read as contributing to a qualitatively different urban era.

Social theorists (for example, Giddens 1990; Taylor 1996; Brenner 1998, 2004; Beck 2006; Robinson 2004) have examined the "embedded statism" that has marked the social sciences generally and has become one obstacle to a theorization of the global through some of these issues. At the heart of embedded statism is the explicit or implicit assumption that the nation-state is the container of social processes. To this I

add two features already discussed in Chapter Three: the implied correspondence of national territory with the national and the associated implication that the national and the non-national are mutually exclusive conditions. These various assumptions work well for many of the subjects studied in the social sciences. But they are not helpful in elucidating a growing number of situations when it comes to globalization and a variety of transnational processes now being studied by social scientists. Nor are they helpful for developing the requisite research techniques. Furthermore, as argued in Chapter Three, although they describe conditions that have held for a long time—throughout much of the history of the modern state since World War I and in some cases for even longer—we are now seeing their partial unbundling. This partial unbundling of the national has significant implications for our analysis and theorization of major social transformations, such as globalization, and the possibility of focusing on the city to get at some of the critical empirical features of these major transformations. And it has significant implications for the city as an object of study.

Pivoting theorization and research on the city is one way of cutting across embedded statism and recovering the rescaling of spatial hierarchies that is under way. Interest in the city as a site for research on major contemporary dynamics is evident in numerous disciplines, each with its own analytic tools. The traditional tools of sociology and social theory, including urban sociology, can accommodate only some aspects of these trends. The exception is an early generation (for example, Castells 1989; Rodriguez and Feagin 1986; Gottdiener 1985; Timberlake 1985; Chase-Dunn 1984; King 1990; Zukin 1991;

Sassen-Koob 1982, 1984—to cite but a few) of what is today a small but rapidly growing sociological scholarship that has explicitly sought to theorize these new conditions and specify them empirically. Traditionally other branches of sociology have used the urban moment to construct their object of research even when it is nonurban. This is especially so because cities are also sites where major trends interact with one another in distinct, often complex manners in a way they do not in most other settings. Today all of this holds also for studying the global in its urban localizations.[2]

Besides the challenge of overcoming embedded statism, there is the challenge of recovering place in the context of globalization, telecommunications, and the proliferation of transnational and translocal dynamics. It is perhaps one of the ironies at the start of a new century that some of the old questions of the early Chicago school of urban sociology should resurface as promising and strategic to an understanding of certain critical issues today. One might ask whether the methods of those scholars (Park and Burgess, 1925; Suttles 1968; see also Duncan 1959) might be of particular use in recovering the category of place at a time when dominant forces such as globalization and telecommunications seem to signal that place and the details of the local no longer matter. Robert Park and the Chicago school conceived of "natural areas" as geographic areas determined by unplanned subcultural forces. This was an urban sociology that used fieldwork within a framework of human ecology and contributed many rich studies mapping detailed distributions and assuming functional complementarity among the diverse "natural areas" these sociologists identified in Chicago.[3]

Yet the old categories are not enough.[4] Some of the major conditions in cities today, including the urban moment of nonurban dynamics, challenge mainstream forms of theorization and urban empirical analysis. Fieldwork is a necessary step in capturing many of the new aspects of the urban condition, including those having to do with the major trends this chapter focuses on. But assuming complementarity or functionalism brings us back to the notion of the city as a bounded space rather than one site, albeit a strategic one, where multiple transboundary processes intersect and produce distinct sociospatial formations. Recovering place can be met only partially using the research techniques of the old Chicago school of urban sociology (see, for example, the debate in Dear et al. 2002; Soja 2000; Dear 2002; see also David A. Smith 1995). I do think we need to return to some of the depth of engagement with urban areas that the Chicago school achieved and the effort to produce detailed mappings. The type of ethnographies done by Duneier (1999), Talmadge Wright (1997), Lloyd 2005, Klinenberg 2002, Small 2004, and Burawoy et al. (2000) and the type of spatial analysis developed by Sampson and Raudenbush (2004) are excellent examples, as they use many of the same techniques yet work within a different set of framing assumptions.

But that is only part of the challenge of recovering place. Recovering place means recovering the multiplicity of presences in this landscape. The large city of today has emerged as a strategic site for a range of new types of operations—political, economic, "cultural," and subjective (Elijah Anderson 1990; Lloyd 2005; Abu-Lughod 1994; Miles 2003; Yuval-Davis 1999; Clark and Hoffmann-Matinot 1998; Nashashibi

2007; Allen, Massey, and Pryke 1999; Fincher and Jacobs 1998; Krause and Petro 2003; Bartlett 2007; Hagedorn 2006). It is one of the nexuses where new claims materialize and assume concrete forms. The loss of power at the national level produces the possibility for new forms of power and politics at the subnational level. Furthermore, insofar as the national as container of social process and power is cracked (for example, Taylor 1995; Sachar 1990; Garcia 2002; Parsa and Keivani 2002), it opens up possibilities for a geography of politics that links subnational spaces across borders. Cities are foremost in this new geography. One question the new geographies engender is whether we are seeing the formation of a new type of transnational politics that localizes in these cities.

Immigration, for instance, is one major process through which a new transnational political economy is being constituted, both at the macro level of global labor markets and at the micro level of translocal household survival strategies. It is still largely embedded in major cities insofar as most immigrants, certainly in the developed world, whether in the United States, Japan, or western Europe, are concentrated in major cities (Castles and Miller 2003; Bhachu 1985; Iredale et al. 2002; Tsuda 1998), although moving to smaller cities and suburbs is a second major pattern (Light 2006; Buntin, n.d.). For some scholars (Castles and Miller 2003; Sassen 1998, pt. 1; Ehrenreich and Hochschild 2003; Skeldon 1997; Samers 2002), immigration is one of the constitutive processes of globalization today, even though it is not recognized or represented as such in mainstream accounts of the global economy. The city is one of the key sites for the empirical study of these transnational flows and household strategies.

Global capital and the new immigrant workforce are two major instances of transnationalized actors with features that constitute each as a somewhat unitary actor overriding borders, but often in contestation with each other inside cities (Sassen 1998, chap. 1; Ehrenreich and Hochschild 2003; see also, for example, Bonilla et al. 1998; Cordero-Guzman, Smith, and Grosfoguel 2001). Researching and theorizing these issues require approaches that diverge from those of the more traditional studies of political elites, local party politics, neighborhood associations, immigrant communities, and others, through which the political landscape of cities and metropolitan regions has traditionally been conceptualized in sociology.

Place and Production in the Global Economy

Globalization can be deconstructed in terms of the strategic sites where global processes and the links that bind them materialize, as was already indicated in Chapters Two and Three. Among these sites are export-processing zones, offshore banking centers, and on a far more complex level, global cities. These sites produce specific geographies of globalization and underline the extent to which these do not encompass the entire world.[5] They are, furthermore, changing geographies that have been transformed over the last few centuries and over the last few decades.[6] Most recently these changing geographies have come to include electronic space.

The overall geography of globalization contains dynamics of spatial dispersal and centralization, the second only recently recognized (e.g., Friedmann 1986; Sassen 1984).[7] The evidence shows that under specific conditions the massive spatial dispersal of economic activities at the metropolitan, national, and

global levels we associate with globalization has actually contributed to new forms of territorial centralization of top-level management and control operations (Sassen 1991, 2001). The spatial dispersal of economic activity made possible by telematics contributes to an expansion of territorially centralized functions if this dispersal is to take place under the continuing concentration in corporate control, ownership, and profit appropriation that characterizes the current economic system.[8] National and global markets, as well as globally integrated organizations, require central places where the work of globalization gets done.[9] Elsewhere (Sassen 2006a, chaps. 5 and 7) I have developed a thesis about finance today as being increasingly transaction-intensive and hence as raising the importance of financial centers because they contain the capabilities for managing this transactivity precisely at a time when the centers assume whole new features, given digitization. Furthermore, information industries require a vast physical infrastructure containing strategic nodes with a hyperconcentration of facilities; we need to distinguish between the capacity for global transmission and communications and the material conditions that make this capacity possible. Also, the most advanced information industries have a production process that is at least partially bound to place because of the combination of resources that process requires even when the outputs are hypermobile. Finally, the vast new economic topography that is being implemented through electronic space is one moment, one fragment, of an even vaster space or economic chain in good part embedded in nonelectronic spaces. There is no fully dematerialized firm or industry. Even the most advanced information industries, such as finance, are only partially installed

in electronic space. And so are industries that produce digital products, such as software design. The growing digitization of economic activities has not eliminated the need for major international business and financial centers, or for Silicon Valleys, and all the material resources they concentrate, from state-of-the-art telematics infrastructure to brain talent (Castells 1989; Graham and Marvin 1996; Sassen 1984; 2006a, chaps. 5, 7, and 8).

In order to recover the infrastructure of activities, firms, and jobs that is necessary to run the advanced corporate economy, including its globalized sectors, in my research I have conceptualized cities as production sites for the leading information industries of our time.[10] These industries are typically conceptualized in terms of the hypermobility of their outputs and the high levels of expertise of their professionals rather than in terms of the production process involved and the requisite infrastructure of facilities and nonexpert jobs that are also part of these industries. A detailed analysis of service-based urban economies shows that there is a considerable articulation of firms, sectors, and workers that may appear to have little connection to an urban economy dominated by finance and specialized services but in fact fulfill a series of functions that are an integral part of that economy. They do so, however, under conditions of sharp social, earning, and often racial or ethnic segmentation (Sassen 2001, chaps. 8 and 9). In the day-to-day work of the leading complex of services dominated by finance, a great many of the jobs are low paying and manual, many of them held by women and immigrants. Although these types of jobs and workers are never represented as part of the global economy, they are in fact part of the infrastructure of the jobs

involved in running and implementing the global economic system, including such an advanced form as international finance.[11] The top end of the corporate economy—the corporate towers that project engineering expertise, precision, *techne*—is far easier to mark as necessary for an advanced economic system than are truckers and other industrial service workers, even though those workers are a necessary ingredient.[12] We see here a dynamic of valorization at work that has sharply increased the distance between the devalorized and the valorized—indeed, the overvalorized—sectors of the economy.

For me as a sociologist, addressing these issues has meant working in several systems of representation and constructing spaces of intersection. There are analytic moments when two systems of representation intersect. Such moments are easily experienced as spaces of silence, of absence. One challenge is to see what happens in those spaces or what operations—of analysis, power, or meaning—take place there. One version of these spaces of intersection is what I have called analytic borderlands (Sassen 1998, chap. 1; 2006a, chap. 8). Why borderlands? Because they are spaces that are constituted in terms of discontinuities—discontinuities are here given a terrain rather than reduced to a dividing line. Much of my work on economic globalization and cities has focused on these discontinuities and has sought to reconstitute them analytically as borderlands rather than dividing lines. This perspective produces a terrain within which these discontinuities can be reconstituted in terms of economic operations whose properties are not merely a function of the spaces on each side (that is, a reduction to the condition of dividing line) but also, and most centrally, are a function of the discontinuity itself, the argument being that

discontinuities are an integral part, a component, of the economic system.

A New Geography of Centers and Margins

The ascendancy of information industries and the growth of a global economy, two inextricably linked conditions, have contributed to a new geography of centrality and marginality. This geography partially reproduces existing inequalities but is also the outcome of a dynamic specific to current forms of economic growth. It assumes many forms and operates in many arenas, from the distribution of telecommunications facilities to the structure of both the economy and employment. Global cities accumulate immense concentrations of economic power, whereas cities that were once major manufacturing centers suffer inordinate declines; downtowns and business centers in metropolitan areas receive massive investments in real estate and telecommunications while low-income urban and metropolitan areas are starved for resources; highly educated workers in the corporate sector see their income rise to unusually high levels while low- or medium-skilled workers see theirs sink. Financial services produce superprofits while industrial services barely survive.[13]

The most powerful of the new geographies of centrality at the global level bind the major international financial and business centers: New York, London, Tokyo, Paris, Frankfurt, Zürich, Amsterdam, Los Angeles, Toronto, Sydney, and Hong Kong, among others. But this geography now also includes cities such as Bangkok, Taipei, São Paulo, and Mexico City. The intensity of transactions among these cities, particularly in the financial markets, trade in services, and investment, has in-

creased sharply, and so have the orders of magnitude involved (for example, Sassen 2006b, chap. 2; Taylor 2004).[14] At the same time there has been a sharpening inequality in the concentration of strategic resources and activities in each of these cities compared with that of other cities in the same countries.[15] Alongside these new global and regional networks of cities is a vast territory that has become increasingly peripheral and increasingly excluded from the major economic processes that are seen as fueling economic growth in the global economy. Formerly important manufacturing centers and port cities have lost functions and are in decline, not only in the less-developed countries but also in the most advanced economies. Similarly, in the valuation of labor inputs, the overvalorization of specialized services and professional workers has marked many of the "other" types of economic activities and workers as unnecessary or irrelevant to an advanced economy.

There are other forms of this segmented marking of what is and what is not an instance of the new global economy. For example, the mainstream account of globalization recognizes that there is an international professional class of workers and highly internationalized business environments due to the presence of foreign firms and personnel. What has not been recognized is the possibility that we are seeing an internationalized labor market for low-wage manual and service workers or that there is an internationalized business environment in many immigrant communities. These processes continue to be couched in terms of immigration, a narrative rooted in an earlier historical period. This suggests that there are instances of the global or the transnational that have not been recognized as

such or are contested. Among them is the question of immigration, as well as the multiplicity of work environments it contributes to large cities, often subsumed under the notions of the ethnic economy and the informal economy. Much of what we still narrate in the language of immigration and ethnicity, I would argue, is actually a series of processes having to do with, first, the globalization of economic activity, cultural activity, and identity formation and, second, the increasingly marked racialization of labor-market segmentation. Thus those components of the production process in the advanced global information economy taking place in immigrant work environments are components not recognized as part of that global information economy. Immigration and ethnicity are constituted as otherness. Understanding them as a set of processes whereby global elements are localized, international labor markets are constituted, and cultures from all over the world are de- and reterritorialized, puts them right there at the center, along with the internationalization of capital, as a fundamental aspect of globalization (see Chapter Five).

How have these new processes of valorization and devalorization and the inequalities they produce come about? This is the subject addressed in the next section.

Elements of a New Sociospatial Order

The implantation of global processes in major cities has meant that the internationalized sector of the urban economy has expanded sharply and has imposed a new set of criteria for valuing or pricing various economic activities and outcomes. This trend has had devastating effects on large sectors of the urban

economy. It is not simply a quantitative transformation; we see here the elements of a new economic regime and its sociospatial expressions. This regime assumes distinct forms in the spatial organization of the urban economy, the structures for social reproduction, and the organization of the labor process. In these trends towards multiple forms of polarization lie conditions for the creation of employment-centered urban poverty and marginality and for new class formations.

The ascendancy of the specialized-services-led economy, particularly the new finance and corporate services complex, engenders what may be regarded as a new economic regime because although this sector may account for only a fraction of the economy of a city, it imposes itself on that larger economy. One of these pressures is toward polarization, as is the case with the possibility for superprofits in finance or in high-end real-estate development, which contributes to the devalorization of manufacturing, low-value-added services, and mid-income housing construction, insofar as these sectors cannot generate superprofits. The superprofit-making capacity of many of the leading industries is embedded in a complex combination of new trends: technologies that make possible the hypermobility of capital at a global scale and the deregulation of multiple markets that allows for implementing that hypermobility; financial inventions such as securitization, which liquefies hitherto illiquid capital and allows it to circulate and hence make additional profits. The increasing complexity and specialization of the corporate services involved have contributed to their valorization, as illustrated in the unusually high salary increases beginning in the 1980s for top-level professionals. Globalization further adds to the complexity of these services, their strategic character, and their glamour, and therewith to their overvalorization.

The presence of a critical mass of firms with extremely high profit-making capabilities contributes to the bidding up of the prices of commercial space, industrial services, and other business needs, thereby making the survival of firms with moderate profit-making capabilities increasingly precarious. And whereas these firms are essential to the operation of the urban economy and the daily needs of a city, their economic viability is threatened in a situation in which finance and specialized services can earn superprofits. High prices and high profit levels in the internationalized sector and its ancillary businesses, such as top-of-the-line restaurants and hotels, make it increasingly difficult for other sectors to compete for space and investments. Many of those other sectors have experienced considerable downgrading and/or displacement—for example, modest neighborhood shops being replaced by upscale boutiques and restaurants catering to the new high-income urban elite.

Inequality in the profit-making capabilities of different sectors of the economy has always existed. But what we see happening today takes place on another order of magnitude and is engendering massive distortions in the operations of various markets, including housing and labor. For example, the income polarization among firms and among households contributes, in my reading (Sassen 2001, chap. 9), to the informalization of a growing array of economic activities in advanced urban economies. When firms with low or modest profit-making ca-

pacities experience an ongoing, if not increasing, demand for their goods and services from households and firms in a city in which a significant sector of the economy makes superprofits, they often cannot compete even though there is an effective demand for what they produce. Operating informally is often one of the few ways in which such firms can survive—for example, by using space not zoned for commercial or manufacturing uses, such as a basement in a residential area, or space that is not up to code in terms of health, fire, and other workplace standards. Similarly, new firms in low-profit industries entering a strong market for their goods and services may be able to do so only informally. Another option for firms with limited profit-making capabilities is to subcontract part of their work to informal operations.[16] The recomposition of the sources of growth and profit making entailed by these transformations also contributes to a reorga-nization of some components of social reproduction or consumption. The rapid growth of industries with strong concentrations of high- and low-income jobs has assumed distinct forms in the consumption structure, which in turn has a feedback effect on the organization of work and the types of jobs being created. The expansion of the high-income workforce in conjunction with the emergence of new cultural forms has led to a process of high-income gentrification that rests, in the last analysis, on the availability of a vast supply of low-wage workers. In turn, the consumption needs of the low-income population in large cities are partially met by manufacturing and retail establishments which are small, rely on family labor, and often fail to meet minimum safety and health standards. Cheap, locally produced sweatshop garments, for example, can compete

with low-cost Asian imports. A growing range of products and services, from low-cost furniture made in basements to "gypsy cabs" and family day care, is available to meet the demand for the growing low-income population. In short, while the middle strata still constitute the majority, the conditions that contributed to their expansion and politico-economic power in the postwar decades—the centrality of mass production and mass consumption in economic growth and profit realization—have been displaced by new sources of growth. This replacement is at its sharpest in global cities.

We can think of these development as constituting new geographies of centrality that cut across the old divide between poor and rich countries, and as constituting new geographies of marginality that have become increasingly evident not only in the less developed world but also within highly developed countries. In major cities in both the developed and the developing world we see a new geography of centers and margins that not only contributes to strengthening existing inequalities but also sets in motion a series of new dynamics of inequality. The new types of informalization evident in global cities are one such new dynamic (Venkatesh 2006; Buechler 2007). We can conceptualize informalization in advanced urban economies today as the systemic equivalent of what we call deregulation at the top of the economy (see Sassen 1998, chap. 8). Both the deregulation of a growing number of leading information industries and the informalization of a growing number of sectors with low profit-making capacities can be conceptualized as adjustments under conditions in which new economic developments and old regulations enter in growing tension.[17] "Regula-

tory fractures" is one concept I have used to capture this condition and not reduce it to notions of crime and violation.

The Localizations of the Global

Economic globalization, then, needs to be understood in its multiple localizations rather than only in terms of the broad, overarching macro-level processes that dominate the mainstream account. Furthermore, we need to see that some localizations do not generally get coded as part of the global economy. Here I want to focus on both recognized and on overlooked localizations of the global. The global city is one strategic instantiation of multiple localizations. Many of these localizations are embedded in the demographic transition evident in cities, where a majority of the resident workers are immigrants and/or women, often women of color. These cities are seeing an expansion of low-wage jobs that do not fit the master images of globalization yet are part of it. The fact that these jobs are largely held by immigrants, minoritized citizens, and disadvantaged women adds to their invisibility and contributes to the devalorization of this type of worker and work culture, and to the "legitimacy" of that devalorization.

This devaluing of workers in growth sectors is a rupture of the traditional dynamic whereby membership in leading economic sectors contributes to the empowerment of workers, a process long evident in Western industrialized economies. Women and immigrants come to replace the Fordist family-wage category of women and children (Sassen 1998, chap. 5; Ehrenreich and Hochschild 2003; Parreñas 2002).[18] Economic restructuring in global cities, one of the localizations of global dynamics, has generated a large growth in the demand for low-

wage workers and for jobs that offer few possibilities of advancement. Women and immigrants emerge as the labor supply that facilitates the imposition of low-wages and powerlessness under conditions of high demand for those workers and the location of those jobs in high-growth sectors. It breaks the historic nexus that would have led to empowering workers and legitimates the break culturally. This is occurring amid an explosion in the wealth and power concentrated in global cities—that is, under conditions in which there is also a visible expansion in high-income jobs.

Another localization of this devaluing, one rarely associated with globalization, is informalization as discussed earlier. It reintroduces the community and the household as important economic spaces in global cities. In this setting informalization is the low-cost—and often feminized—equivalent of deregulation at the top of the system. As with deregulation (for example, financial deregulation), informalization introduces flexibility, reduces the "burdens" of regulation, and lowers costs—in this case, the costs of labor and workplace standards in particular. Informalization in major cities of highly developed countries (whether New York, London, Paris, or Berlin) can be seen as the downgrading of a variety of activities for which there is an effective demand. Informalization also brings with it a devaluing and enormous competition among poor workers, given low entry costs and few alternative forms of employment. Going informal is one way of producing and distributing goods and services at a lower cost and with greater flexibility. Immigrants and women, both important actors in the new informal economies of global cities, absorb the costs of informalization (see Sassen 1998, chap. 8; Buechler 2007).

The reconfiguration of economic spaces associated with globalization in major cities has had differential effects on women and men, male and female work cultures, and male- and female-centered forms of power and empowerment. The restructuring of the labor market brings with it a shift of labor-market functions to the household or the community. Women and households emerge as sites that should be part of the theorization of the particular social forms produced by these economic dynamics. In contrast, Fordism and mass production generally moved paid work away from women and households. Notwithstanding their many negative features, these transformations contain possibilities, even if limited, for the autonomy and empowerment of women. For instance, we might ask whether the growth of informalization in advanced urban economies reconfigures some economic relationships between men and women. With informalization the neighborhood and the household reemerge as sites for economic activity. This condition has its own dynamic possibilities for women. Economic downgrading through informalization creates "opportunities" for low-income female entrepreneurs and workers and therewith reconfigures some of the work and household hierarchies that women find themselves in, particularly for immigrant women from countries with rather traditional male-centered cultures. There is a large literature showing that immigrant women's paid work and their improved access to other public realms affect their gender relations (Fernandez-Kelly and Shefner 2005; Kofman et al. 2000; Ribas-Mateos 2005).

Immigrant women gain greater relative personal autonomy and independence while men lose ground. They gain more control over budgeting and other domestic decisions and greater

leverage in requesting that men help with domestic chores. Besides the relatively greater empowerment of women in the household associated with waged employment, there is a second important outcome: their greater participation in the public sphere and their possible emergence as public actors. They are the ones in the family who access public services. This gives them a chance to become incorporated into the mainstream society and be the ones who mediate between the household and the state. There are two public arenas in which immigrant women are active: institutions for public and private assistance and the immigrant or ethnic community (Chinchilla and Hamilton 2001). For example, Hondagneu-Sotelo (1994) found that immigrant women come to assume more active public and social roles, further reinforcing their status in the household and the settlement process. Women are more active than men in community building and community activism, and they are positioned differently from men with regard to the broader economy and the state (Moghadan 2005). They are most likely the ones who deal with the legal vulnerability of the family in the process of seeking public and social services. This greater participation by women suggests the possibility that they may emerge as more forceful and visible actors. There is, to some extent, a joining of two dynamics in the condition of these segments of the low-income female workforce in global cities. On the one hand they are constituted as an invisible and disempowered class of workers in the service of the strategic sectors of the global economy (Ehrenreich and Hochschild 2003). This invisibility keeps them from emerging as whatever would be the contemporary equivalent of the "labor aristocracy" of earlier forms of economic organization, in which a low-

wage worker's position in leading sectors had the effect of empowering that worker (it allowed for the possibility of unionizing). On the other hand the access to (albeit low) wages and salaries, the growing feminization of the job supply, and the growing feminization of business opportunities as a consequence of informalization alter the gender hierarchies in which women find themselves (Buechler 2007).[19]

It is likely that some women benefit more than others from these circumstances; we need more research to establish the impact of class, education, and income on these gendered outcomes (see, for example, Chesney-Lind and Hagedorn 1999).

The Global City: A Nexus for New Politico-Economic Alignments

What makes the processes described above strategic, even though they involve powerless and often invisible workers, is that these global cities are also the strategic sites for the valorization of the new forms of global corporate capital, as described in the first section of this chapter. Typically the analysis of the globalization of the economy privileges the reconstitution of capital as an internationalized presence; it emphasizes the vanguard character of this reconstitution. At the same time it remains absolutely silent about another crucial element of transnationalization, one that some, like me, see as the counterpart of capital: the transnationalization of labor beyond top-level professionals. We are still using the language of immigration to describe low-wage transnational workers.[20] That analysis also overlooks the transnationalization in the formation of identities and loyalties among various population segments that explicitly reject the imagined community of the nation.

With this rejection come new solidarities and notions of membership. Major cities have emerged as strategic sites for both the transnationalization of labor and the formation of transnational identities. In this regard, they form a site for new types of politics, including new kinds of transnational politics.

Cities are the terrain on which people from many countries are most likely to meet and a multiplicity of cultures can come together. The international character of major cities lies not only in their telecommunications infrastructure and international firms; it lies also in the many cultural environments in which their workers exist. One can no longer think of centers of international business and finance simply in terms of their corporate towers and their corporate culture. The large Western city of today concentrates diversity. Its spaces are inscribed with the dominant corporate culture but also with a multiplicity of other cultures and identities. The slippage is evident: the dominant culture can encompass only part of the city.[21] And while corporate power inscribes these cultures and identities with "otherness," thereby devaluing them, they are present everywhere. For example, through immigration a proliferation of originally highly localized cultures has become a presence in many large cities. An immense array of cultures from around the world, each rooted in a particular country or village, is now reterritorialized in a few places, such as New York, Los Angeles, Paris, London, Amsterdam, and most recently, Tokyo.[22] Today's global cities are in part the spaces of postcolonialism and indeed contain conditions for the formation of a postcolonialist discourse (see, for example, Stuart Hall 1991; King 1990; Ribas-Mateos 2005; Tsuda 1999).[23]

Immigration and ethnicity are too often constituted as oth-

erness. Understanding them as a set of processes whereby global elements are localized, international labor markets are constituted, and cultures from all over the world are deterritorialized, puts them right there at centerstage, along with the internationalization of capital, as a fundamental aspect of globalization today. Furthermore, this way of narrating the migration events of the postwar era captures the ongoing weight of colonialism and postcolonial forms of empire on major processes of globalization today, specifically those binding emigration and immigration countries (see Chapter Five). While the specific genesis and content of their responsibility will vary from case to case and period to period, none of the major immigration countries are innocent bystanders: their past as colonial powers in many of today's emigration countries lives on (Sassen 1988, 1999c). The centrality of global cities in immigration, including their role as a postcolonial frontier, engenders a transnational economic and political opening in the formation of new claims by immigrants and minoritized citizens (Hamilton and Chinchilla 2001; Farrer 2007; Stasiulis and Yuval-Davis 1995). Global cities have emerged as a site for claims by both global capital, which uses the city as an "organizational commodity," and disadvantaged sectors of the urban population, which are frequently as internationalized a presence in large cities as capital.

I see this as a type of political opening that contains unifying capacities across national boundaries and sharpening conflicts within those boundaries. Global capital and the new immigrant workforce are two major transnational categories, each with unifying properties internally and in contestation with each other in global cities. The leading sectors of corporate capital are now global in both their organization and their operations. And many of the disadvantaged workers in global cities are women, immigrants, and people of color, groups with a mostly troubled relation to the national state (Chatterjee 1993, chaps. 1, 6, and 7; Crenshaw et al. 1996; Geddes 2003; Schiffauer et al. 2006). The global city is a strategic site for their economic and political operations.

The linking of people to territory as constituted in global cities is less likely to be intermediated by the national state or the "national culture" than in other types of locations, such as suburbs or small towns. In global cities, the loosening of identities from their traditional sources, notably the nation or the village (Yaeger 1996; Nashashibi 2007), can engender new notions of community of membership and entitlement. Yet another way of thinking about the political implications of this strategic transnational space is the notion of the formation of new claims on that space. Economic globalization has partially shaped the formation of new claims, and thereby new entitlements, a process that is much clearer in the case of foreign firms than that of immigrants.[24]

Foreign firms and international businesspeople are among the new "city users" (Martinotti 1993) that have profoundly marked the urban landscape. Perhaps at the other extreme are those who use urban political violence to make their claims on the city, claims that lack the de facto legitimacy enjoyed by international businesspeople (Body-Gendrot 1999; Hagedorn 2006). These are claims made by actors struggling for recognition, entitlement, and their rights to the city.[25] There is something to be captured here: a distinction between powerlessness and the condition of being an actor or political subject even

though one lacks power. I use the term *presence* to name this condition. In the context of a strategic space such as the global city, the types of disadvantaged people described here are not simply marginal; they acquire presence in a broader political process that escapes the boundaries of the formal polity. This presence signals the possibility of a politics. What that politics will be depends on the specific projects and practices of various communities (Drainville 2004; Bartlett 2007). Insofar as the sense of membership of these communities is not subsumed under the national, it may well signal the possibility of a transnational politics centered in concrete localities.

Conclusion

Large cities around the world are the terrain on which a multiplicity of globalization processes assume concrete, localized forms. These forms are in good part what globalization is about. If we consider further that a growing share of disadvantaged populations—immigrants in Europe and the United States, African Americans and Latinos in the United States, rural migrants in Asia, masses of shanty dwellers in the megacities of the developing world—are concentrated in large cities, then we can see that cities have become strategic spaces where a series of conflicts and contradictions take place. We can then think of cities also as one of the sites where the contradictions of the globalization of capital can play out. On the one hand large cities concentrate a disproportionate share of corporate power and are one of the key sites for the overvalorization of the corporate economy; on the other hand they concentrate a disproportionate share of the disadvantaged and are one of the key sites for their devalorization. This joint presence happens

in a context where, first, the transnationalization of economies has grown sharply and cities have become increasingly strategic for global capital and, second, marginalized people have found their voice and are making their own claims on the city. This joint presence is further brought into focus by the sharpening of the distance between the two.

The enormity of the urban experience, the overwhelming presence of massive architectures and dense infrastructures, as well as the irresistible utility logics that organize much of the investments in today's cities, have produced displacement and estrangement among many individuals and whole communities. Such conditions unsettle older notions and experiences of the city generally and public space in particular. While the monumentalized public spaces of European cities remain vibrant sites for rituals and routines, for demonstrations and festivals, increasingly the overall sense is of a shift from civic to politicized urban space, with fragmentations along multiple differences.

The space constituted by the worldwide grid of global cities, a space with new economic and political potentialities, is perhaps one of the most strategic spaces for the formation of new types of politics, identities, and communities, including transnational ones. This is a space that is place-centered in that it is embedded in particular and strategic sites, and transterritorial in that it connects sites that are not geographically proximate yet are intensely connected to one another. It is not only the transmigration of capital that takes place on this global grid but also that of people, both rich (such as the new transnational professional workforce) and poor (most migrant workers), and it is a space for the transmigration of cultural forms,

or the reterritorialization of "local" subcultures. An important question is whether it is also a space for a new politics, one going beyond the politics of culture and identity, though at least in part likely to be embedded in them. The analysis presented in this chapter suggests that it is.

The centrality of place in a context of global processes engenders a transnational economic and political opening in the formation of new claims and hence in the constitution of entitlements—notably, rights to place—and, ultimately in the constitution of new forms of "citizenship" and the diversifying of citizenship practices. The global city has emerged as a site for new claims: by global capital and the new city users, and by disadvantaged sectors of the urban population, frequently as internationalized a presence in large cities as the former. The denationalizing of urban space and the formation of new claims centered in transnational actors and involving contestation constitute the global city as a frontier zone for a new type of engagement.

Chapter Five
The Making of International Migrations

As with the state and the city, incorporating international migrations into a sociology of globalization entails engaging a vast scholarship that is not particularly focused on globalization.[1] Furthermore, it entails contesting a very different type of scholarship, as yet minor but growing fast, that seems to assume that we have immigrations because of globalization, an assumption it arrives at not through knowledge about migrations but by projecting standard globalization notions onto migration. While the first scholarship is a critical source of data and research techniques that need to be incorporated into sociological studies of globalization, the second is extremely problematic and to be avoided.

Cross-border migrations existed long before the current phase of globalization. Thus the task is to understand in what ways and under what conditions today's many migrations are or are not shaped by, grounded in, or merely inflected by globalization. The rich migration scholarship shows us, for instance, that transnational networks between sending and receiving countries were already part of many migration flows centuries ago. The content and modes of communications and transactions in the past may have differed sharply from today's, but the actual social fact was present in the past. Similarly, the